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THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, the center of power for agricultural policy
lay firmly in the national capitals. With the signing of the Treaty
of Rome,1 that authority began a gradual flow from the Member
States to the institutions of the EEC, particularly the Commission
located in Brussels. The transition is not yet complete and has not
been without its setbacks, but most Europeans and all the governments of the Member States now accept and support the reality
of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The innovative steps
taken by the EEC in attempting to weld the agricultural economies of the several states into a whole have profoundly affected the
way each farmer in the EEC operates his business. Proposed major
structural changes portend even more profound repercussions in
the farming community. The success of this transition may be
attributed in part to the particular deftness and skill the Commission has shown in accepting its responsibilities. Credit for any
success must also go to the European Court of Justice. The Court
has persistently insisted that Member States yield to the goals of
Community policy even when the Member State, in a moment of
national expediency, might wish to forego the more painful burdens of the transition.

11. A LOOK

AT AGRICULTURE IN THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES

A survey of the state of European agriculture will quickly illustrate why the leadership of the Member States sought to address
the difficulties on a united front. Farms in Europe contrast vividly
with those in other western countries. The most obvious difference
is size. One survey shows that the average farm ranges from 15
acres in Belgium to about 38 acres in France.2 While 21 per cent
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), March
25, 1957. The authoritative English text of the treaty may be found in TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(Office of Official Publications of the

European Communities, 1973). An unofficial English text may be found in 298

U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
2. Dam, The European Common Market In Agriculture, 67 COLUM. L. REv.
209, 210 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dam]. This article provides an excellent indepth discussion of the problems encountered in the attempt to move decisionmaking authority from the Member States to the Community.
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of the field crop sales in the United States comes from farms of over
1,000 acres, 21 per cent of German production comes from farms
of only 125 acres or over.3 Over the years, these farms have been
divided among the farmers' children with the result that a large
number of small plots are often spread over a wide area. In
Germany and Luxembourg, for instance, the average plot is only
1.8 acres.4 Since the European farmer is often reluctant to treat the
farm as an asset to be bought and sold, the farmer never has
enough land area in one place to make mechanized techniques
feasible.
The inefficiency of this kind of production process makes agriculture much more labor intensive than in the United States. By
illustration, in 1920 about 27 per cent of the United States labor
force was engaged in agriculture, but by 1962, that figure had been
reduced to only 8 per cent. In 1920, agriculture absorbed 28 per
cent of the French labor force, and in 1962, 21 per cent of all
workers were still on the farm. Sicco Mansholt, EEC Commissioner and one of the prime movers in the EEC agricultural policy,
once commented that it takes about 23 agricultural workers in
Europe to take care of the land that two can handle in the United
States.
In the EEC farm incomes are considerably lower than incomes
in other sectors, despite extensive government assistance to the
agricultural sector. German farm incomes, for example, have only
averaged about 70 per cent of non-agricultural wages in recent
years. The price of European agricultural products is generally
higher also. The market price of wheat in France is generally about
20 per cent higher than the standard United States price while
German prices range about 50 per cent higher.'
Facing this kind of competitive disadvantage, the European
farmer would soon be unemployed absent government assistance.
The national governments understandably have been unwilling to
permit this large segment of their work force to be idled and so
have stepped into the market to protect the farmer from damaging
3. Id. at 210, 211.
4. Id. at 211.
5. The situation in Italy was even more pronounced. There, 56 per cent of the
labor force was engaged in agriculture in 1920; by 1962 that figure had only been
reduced to 28 per cent. There is evidence of some progress however. The Community average of workers engaged in agriculture was 13 per cent in 1970, down
from 28 per cent in 1950. The EEC prognosticators suggest that this trend will
continue.
6. Dam, supra note 2, at 213.
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foreign competition. An array of protective schemes was devised by
the various states to insure that the farmer would have a market
for his products and that the consumer would have a good supply
of foodstuffs without undue dependence on foreign supplies. 7 Government protection included tariffs, internal taxes, quantitative
restrictions, subsidies, import monopolies, and other measures.8
Much of the cost of these measures was absorbed by the taxpayers
since government resources had to be allocated for the direct subsidies. The remainder was paid for by the consumer in higher food
prices. Although substantial imports were required to supplement
domestic sources, governmental intervention was successful in
guaranteeing the farmer a secure, albeit mediocre, livelihood. Agricultural economists reluctantly supported these measures as necessary expedients for economic stability but consistently pointed
out that over the long run extensive governmental intervention
would keep inefficient farming operations in business and lock in
the inadequacies of the existing system. There was general agreement that some major changes would have to be made in agricultural policy if agriculture was to reach a level of competitive pro-

ductivity. 9
7. It is estimated that the original six members of the EEC can supply approximately 90 per cent of their agricultural produce needs from their own resources.
In the United Kingdom, that figure is something closer to 50 per cent. France is
the main agricultural exporter within the EEC. The areas along the Seine River
in the Paris Basin are ideally suited to grain production, but France has not yet
been able to produce enough to satisfy the demands of the other members of the
EEC. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy export significant
quantities of several products also. Germany and Italy are the food-deficit countries within the EEC. Germany cannot supply all of her domestic needs in any
major product area and Italy has achieved self-sufficiency in wine and poultry
only. Although food production has increased substantially within the Common
Market, the purchase of foods from non-member sources has also increased substantially. R. BROAD & R. JARRETT, COMMUNITY EUROPE 70-73 (1968).
8. Dam, supra note 2, at 214.
9. Interest in developing a European agricultural community began following
World War II. In 1950, the Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended to
the Committee of Ministers that such an organization be created. While several
plans for such an organization were submitted and discussed in the years that
followed, the plans that received the most attention were those submitted by
Sicco Mansholt, the Dutch Minister of Agriculture, and by Pierre Pflimlin, the
French Minister of Agriculture. Both of these plans would have created an international authority and vested it with some sovereign rights.
A series of conferences was held in the early 1950's to discuss these plans and
to attempt an agreement on the creation of such an organization. While those
efforts were unsuccessful, they did provide a helpful background for the more
successful efforts that followed.
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A supranational structure was essential to promote meaningful
changes, but a variety of complex problems had to be solved before
the various national states were willing to give up control of agricultural policy to such an agency. The states wanted assurances
that changes would be made gradually and with sensitivity to the
unique needs of their individual agricultural interests. The gradient in productive efficiency from country to country was so great
in some agricultural sectors that attempts to bring about a rapid
modernization might cause severe economic dislocation in the
more inefficient areas. The states properly recognized the political
pressure that could result from such dislocation and were consequently unwilling to turn over control of agricultural policy without the right to intervene when a crisis occurred in their domestic
markets. The agricultural provisions of the Treaty of Rome reflect
an attempt to balance these rather complex national and Community interests.

III.

AGRICULTURE AND THE TREATY OF ROME: TOWARD A COMMON
AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Of all the problems facing Europe, the agricultural dilemma
presented one of the ripest opportunities for European cooperation.
However, the leaders who met at the Conference of Messina in 1955
were deeply divided on the question of how agriculture was to fit
within the larger EEC structure. 0 One group sought to have agriculture treated under the general provisions of the treaty like every
other economic sector. Another group wanted agriculture included
in the EEC organization also, but wanted the treaty to carve out
areas of special treatment for agriculture which would exempt that
sector from the free trade and competition rules governing the
other areas of the economy."
When the treaty was finally signed, agriculture was subject to
all the free trade and competition rules that governed the other
sections." However, an escape clause was provided which enabled
The initial planning for the establishment of the European Economic Community was taken as a result of the resolutions adopted at the Conference of
Messina in 1955. The work that followed was compiled and presented in 1956 in
the Spaak Report. The proposals outlined in that report provided the basis for
discussions that led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 1 CCH Comm.
MKT. REP. 402 at 513-14 (1973).
10. See 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 402 at 514 (1973).
11. Id.
12. EEC art. 38.
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certain products to be removed from the general provisions of the
treaty and given special treatment.13 This kind of special treatment was available for any product listed in annex III' of the treaty
if common marketing organizations for that product had been set
up by the Commission. Since the treatment accorded the farmer
under the agricultural regulations was thought to be superior to the
treatment accorded under the general provisions of the treaty, incentive was generated within the farming community for the establishment of the marketing organizations. In the years which
followed, marketing organizations were established for most of the
product areas listed in annex 11.15 Since that list included virtually
every significant agricultural product produced in the Common
Market countries, 6 the general treaty provisions now remain applicable only to the relatively unimportant products not included
in annex 11.17 The vast number of cases brought to the Court of
Justice relating to agricultural questions usually involve matters
arising from the Community's complex regulatory mechanisms.
Most of this litigation would never have materialized if agriculture
had been subjected to the general rules of the treaty. The decision
to accord special treatment to agriculture was a clear policy choice
by the treaty's signers founded on the fear that agriculture could
not survive the dislocations that would result if governed by the
general free trade provisions of the treaty.
Article 39 of the treaty defined four objectives for the common
agricultural policy: (1) to increase agricultural productivity; (2) to
increase the income of the farm population; (3) to stabilize markets; and (4) to insure supplies at reasonable prices. As insurance
13. EEC art. 40.
14. Twenty-four product areas are described in the list, but certain kinds of
by-products are specifically excepted from the list. All meat, fish, dairy, and
vegetable products are included.
15. Approximately 90 per cent of the Community farm sector is covered by a
common market organization. These organizations have the object of providing:
(1) common external protection, (2) the removal of obstacles to intra-Community
trade, (3) the protection and improvement of farmers' incomes, and (4) the avoidance of distortions of competition caused by national subsidies. The basic policy
governing these common market organizations is expressed in article 39 of the
treaty. However, the Commission issued regulations governing these organizations relying on article 43. See 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 402 at 517 (1973).
16. Id.
17. Those product areas not included in annex I and those areas which are
included but for which no common market organization has been established are
still subject to the provisions of article 37 governing state trading monopolies. 1
CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 402 at 514 (1973).
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against heavy-handedness, the treaty requires the Community policymakers to consider the social structure and the natural disparities between the various agricultural regions. Further, the treaty
requires the EEC to recognize the need to make appropriate policy
adjustments gradually with the caveat that agriculture is a sector
closely linked to the whole economy. 8
The Community institutions were authorized to devise any measures necessary to carry out the goals of article 39.19 Common arrangements to regulate imports and exports, aids for production
and distribution, price regulation, and other techniques were available to the Commission. More importantly, article 40 authorized
guidance and guarantee funds to finance Community agricultural
programs.
Although the treaty had created the skeletal framework for a
common agricultural policy, specific elements were unresolved.
Soon after the adoption of the treaty, the Member States met in
Stresa, Italy, to begin formulating a comprehensive Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)."o In 1960, the Commission prepared its proposals and submitted them to the Council for approval. 2' By 1962,
the Council reached agreement on the fundamentals of the CAP
and on the timetable for implementation.22 The policy agreed upon
23
included provisions for the following:
1. TransitionPeriod.-A seven year transition period was established from 1 July, 1962, to 31 December, 1969. A decision was
made in 1966 to shorten that period and bring the policy into full
implementation in 1968.24
18.

EEC art. 39.

19. EEC art. 40.
20. 1 CCH COMM.
21.

MKT. REP.

402 at 516-17 (1973).

A. WALSH & J. PAXTON, THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON
MARKET 56 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WALSH & PAXTON]. The agriculture chapter of this book provides an excellent summary of the development of the CAP
during the 1960's.
22. Id. at 56-57.
23. Id. at 57-63. The provisions of the CAP described in the text are not
intended to be a comprehensive outline of the entire CAP. Hopefully, however,
this sketch will be sufficient to give the reader a framework for understanding the
Court's decisions discussed in later sections.
24. West Germany and the Netherlands had proposed that January 1, 1968,
should be the target date for full implementation of the Common Market on both
agricultural and industrial goods. France held out claiming that she could not
accept a final removal of tariffs on industrial goods until the common agricultural
market had been completed. The Member States agreed to compromise on July
1, 1968, still ahead of the dates set out in the Treaty of Rome. Id. at 77.
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2. Quality Standards.-Common quality standards were to be
applied to fruits and vegetables marketed within the producing
Member States. The exporting Member States had the responsibility to insure that the common standards were met before allowing export.
3. Harmonizationof Prices.-Pricesfor most products were to
be harmonized between a lower limit based on French prices and
an upper limit based on German prices. These standardized or
"target" prices were to be set annually by the Commission. The
target price did not become the standard sale price of the commodity throughout the Community but it did provide the basis for the
variable levy. Through this device the actual market price of a
product was close to the target price.
For grain products, "intervention" prices were also set. If the
market price fell below this price, government marketing organizations would buy up supplies from the producers at the intervention
price and export the commodity or store it until shortages devel25

oped.

4. The Safeguard Clause.-This was an escape clause which
permitted a Member State unilaterally to close its frontier to importation of a product if its home production was jeopardized. This
provision applied to all products covered by the CAP. A Member
State taking such action was required to inform the Commission
of its action immediately, and the Commission in turn was required to decide within four days whether the closure was justified.
An appeal from the Commission's decision could only be taken to
the Court of Justice. "
5. The Management Committee.-Management committees
were established for certain specified products. Composed of representatives from the Member States, these committees would be
consulted by the Commission in the formulation of policies for that
product area. While the management committee's function was
essentially advisory, referral of a question to the Council was required if the management committee disagreed with the Commission.27
6. Variable Levies.-The system of variable levies was viewed
25. Dam, supra note 2, at 217-40, discusses the levy system and the transition
to a single price system in some detail. That discussion suggests that the system
devised by the EEC, although a major step forward from the tariff system, has
some formidable complications of its own. See also 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP.
426 at 532 (1973) for a general outline of the complete price system.
26. 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 426 at 535 (1973).
27. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 426 at 536 (1973).
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as one of the real innovations of the EEC." The levy was assessed
on products entering a Member State from outside the Community
and superseded any national tariff measures on that product. The
levy was equal to the difference between the target price and the
world market price. It fluctuated with the world market price, but
consistently kept the price of foreign products equal to the target
price. If the domestic price of a product was higher than the target
price, the domestic price was forced down by the imported product. By using this device, the Commission achieved, with reasonable certainty, price harmonization throughout the Community.
During the transitional period, a system of intra-Community levies
was also employed, but the levy rates were designed to insure that
products from Member States would have a competitive advantage.2"
7. The Agricultural Fund.-The agricultural programs of the
Community were to be financed by a Guidance and Guarantee
Fund." The guarantee section of the fund was to absorb most of
the fund's budget to finance the Community's price supports. 1
The guidance section was to receive about one-fifth of the budget
to finance subsidies to Member States for structural projects such
as soil improvement and land reform.
Prior to the end of the transitional period, the money to finance2
the fund came from retrospective assessments on Member States.
Part of each Member State's contribution came from the import
levies and part came from direct contributions. The money received through operation of the levies, however, remained the
"property" of the collecting Member State. 4 A move by several
Member States in 1965 to transfer ownership of the levy receipts
directly to the Community precipitated a boycott of the Community by the French who opposed provisions of the plan which
would have broadly expanded the voting power of the European
28.

See note 25 supra.

29. WALSH & PAXTON, supra note 21, at 61.
30. Although the treaty included precise provisions on some EEC financial
institutions, the only reference to an agricultural fund is in article 40 which
provides simply that "one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee funds may
be set up." Thus, the form and function of the EAGGF have evolved substantially
over the years of its existence. 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 905Q (1973).
31. Norton, The Heart of the Matter: U.K. and the EEC, the Problem of
Agriculture, 6 TEX. INT'L L.F. 221, 237 (1971).
32. Id.
33. WALSH & PAXTON, supra note 21, at 60.
34. Dam, supra note'2, at 253.
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Parliament.35 After considerable negotiation on the matter the
Member States finally agreed to hand over all levies and customs
duties to the Community after 1975 along with the proceeds of a
value-added tax." This will provide the fund with substantial revenue reasonably independent of national control.
The Commission has gone about the task of forging a common
agricultural policy zealously; and an active commitment has been
made to achieve long term structural changes in the agricultural
community. 7 Much progress has been made in eliminating agricultural customs duties in trade between members. The Community has conducted negotiations with non-member states and
signed trade agreements as an international personality." Common prices have been achieved on most major commodity items. 9
A vast body of technical regulations have been issued to govern
most of the basic commodities produced in the Community. These
major accomplishments should suggest that the delicate transition
from national to Community policy is being made with general
consensus of the Member States and is producing positive results."
IV. THE COURT OF JUSTICE AS ARBITER
A vast system of regulations quickly developed as the Commission took charge of agricultural policy. These regulations were
35. France was the largest beneficiary of the fund and was in a position to gain
the most financially from Common Market ownership of the fund's resources.

However, the French strongly opposed any attempts to achieve European political
union, and the granting of real power to the Assembly would be just such a step.
The Commission, at the urging of some of the Member States, presented this plan
which linked the two together. Some view the subsequent French boycott as the
most significant crisis in the history of the Community. See Dam, supra note 2,
at 251-56.
36. I1 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW 101 (1973).
37. The Mansholt Plan is the major thrust of this effort. This plan seeks to
cut down on the number of uneconomical farm units and on the number of people
depending on agriculture for their livelihood by consolidating the smaller farms
and retraining the surplus labor. To complement this plan, a variety of techniques
are employed. Older people are offered an annual supplemental income allowance
if they agree to retire and release their land. Younger farmers are offered nonfarming jobs in their region. Further, present government programs which stimulate surplusage in certain market areas are being discontinued. Id. at 102.
38. Id. at 101.
39. Id. at 114-18.
40. This generally positive picture should not suggest that a unified agricultural policy has not created some problems of its own. The inability of the EEC
to find a workable solution to the disparities created by currency revaluations by
Member States has been a source of considerable tension. Id. at 101, 102.
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challenged in a variety of ways, usually by Member States,
importers, or exporters." The discussion in the following sections
attempts to focus on the Court's response to those challenges in
several specific areas. The topical areas selected for discussion are
those in which significant litigation has taken place. While the list
is not exhaustive, the areas discussed are sufficiently representative to give the reader an insight into the Court's approach to
agricultural litigation.
A.

The Relationship of the Agricultural Section to the General
Provisions of the Treaty.

Article 12 of the treaty prohibits new customs duties or charges
having similar effect. In annex II of the treaty," a list of agricultural products was excepted from that provision once common
marketing organizations were established. In a Court decision
construing the relationship between these provisions, Belgium and
Luxembourg had imposed a new duty on gingerbread, and the
Court disallowed the action.4 3 The Commission asserted that gingerbread was not on the list of exempted products in annex II, and
thus the general provisions of the treaty applied to that product.
The Court rejected the argument that gingerbread was actually on
the list of exempted products since the components of gingerbread
(rye, sugar, etc.) were on the list. The Court stated that the annex
II list of exempted products was to be construed narrowly. A
broader construction would remove more than the treaty writers
intended from the umbrella of the general treaty provisions.
The safeguard provisions have been challenged as violations of
other provisions of the treaty. The safeguard provisions were included in the treaty to permit the Member States, upon approval
by the EEC, to temporarily impose tariff and quota devices to
prevent major dislocations in a domestic market.44 A Dutch import
41. References to Court of Justice cases in the footnotes do not cite directly
to the regulations because the decision is usually the interpretation of several
regulations construed together, and most of the regulations are very short-lived.
Reference to them would be confusing and of little value to the reader in understanding the policy choices made by the Court. If one is interested in reading the
actual regulations interpreted by the Court, reference to the regulation may be

found in the cited decision.
42. See note 15 supra.
43. Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, 8 Recueil de la Jurisprudence
de la Cour (Cour de Justice de la Communautd europ~ene) 813 [hereinafter cited
as Recueill, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. T 8004, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1962).
44. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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company4 5 argued that safeguard provisions designed to protect
domestic apple producers would distort competition in violation of
article 3(f).11 The imposition of safeguard tariffs and quotas obviously clashed with the purpose expressed in article 3(f) and elsewhere in the treaty of achieving free trade between Member States.
In sustaining the safeguard measures, the Court pointed out that
the objectives of the treaty as expressed in article 3 were frequently
in conflict. While 3(f) emphasized the development of competitive
systems within the EEC, article 3(d) envisioned "the adoption of
a common policy in the sphere of agriculture." The special importance of this latter objective was underlined, the Court suggested,
by article 39.47 Since article 42 stipulates that agriculture is subject
to the rules of competition "only to the extent determined by the
Council," the Commission did not violate the treaty by imposing
the safeguard provisions. Similarly, in another case the Court rejected a claim by German importers that additional safeguard levies on dairy products imported from Holland were invalid. The
regulations in question were based on article 226, the general escape clause of the treaty, rather than on Commission safeguard
regulations. The importers argued that since article 226 was to be
applicable only during the transition period, the article was no
longer valid because the transition period had ended for milk and
dairy products with the publication of Regulation No. 804/6811 prohibiting the imposition of customs duties and charges having the
same effect on those commodities. In rejecting all these arguments
the Court pointed out that article 38, paragraph 2 provided for the
applicability of the general provisions of the treaty to agriculture.
Even though the transition period for various products may end at
various times, the Court pointed out that so far as the general
treaty provisions were concerned, there was only one transition
period-the one provided in article 8. The Court concurred with
the conclusions of the Advocate General that by adopting the
plaintiff's argument, Community regulations would have the effect
45.

NV International Fruit Company v. Commission, 17 Recueil 411,'2 CCH

COMM. MKT. REP.

8142 (1971).

46. "[The Community shall include . . . the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted." EEC art. 3(f).
47. Article 39 sets out the objectives of the CAP. See notes 18-19 supra and
accompanying text.
48. Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Emmerich, 17 Recueil 23, 2 CCH CotM. MKT. REP. 8124, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
238 (1971).
49. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8124 at 7391.
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of rendering obsolete or rescinding a provision of the treaty. Such
a result would be a clear circumvention of the revision procedures
of the treaty."
The complex setting of agriculture within the Common Market
structure is best illustrated by the Court's decision in Germany v.
Commission." The Commission had set high tariffs on oranges
imported from non-member countries to encourage development of
the orange industry in Italy. Germany, incurring substantially
higher prices for oranges as a result, requested the Commission to
suspend the tariff under the authority of article 25, paragraph 3.52
The Commission refused and plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Justice claiming that the Commission had abused its discretion by
considering the factors outlined in article 39 as well as those described in article 29.11 Plaintiffs contended essentially that the
agricultural sections of the treaty were inapplicable to actions
taken under the authority of one of the non-agricultural sections.
The Court rejected the argument and found that the Commission
could consider the agricultural goals described in article 39 along
with the factors descrbed in article 29 when taking this kind of

action.
These Court decisions have brought clarity to some of the more
ambiguous trouble spots. Agriculture remains effectively subject

to the general provisions of the treaty, but the agricultural sections
give the Commission the flexibility it needs to deal with problems
unique to agriculture.
50. 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8124 at 7396-97, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 25152. Article 236 defines the procedure for amending the treaty. The Advocate
General argued that the plaintiff's interpretation of the law here would actually
effect a revision of the treaty by the Commission. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8124
at 7400, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 243.
51. Germany v. Commission, 9 Recueil 269, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8016,
2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 369 (1963).
52. EEC art. 25(3): "In the case of the products listed in Annex II to this
Treaty, the Commission may authorize any Member State to suspend, in whole
or in part, collection of the duties applicable or may grant such Member State
tariff quotas at a reduced rate of duty or duty free, provided that no serious
disturbance of the market of the products concerned results therefrom."
53. Article 29 outlines several factors that should guide the Commission as it
exercises its responsibilities under the treaty-in this case, as it takes actions
described in article 25(3).
54. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8016 at 7319, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 391-92.
The Court stated in its opinion that "Article 39 cannot, of course, be given the
same importance as Article 29. But it does set limits on its application inasmuch
as the objectives set forth must be taken into consideration . ..."
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Export/Import Licenses (Bonding requirement and force
majeure)

An integral part of the Community regulatory process is the
internal export and import licensing system. An individual or a
corporation desiring to move goods from one Member State to
another must procure a license before he can complete the transaction. The record kept of licenses issued provides the Commission
with a reliable basis for analyzing market trends. More importantly, however, the licenses give the Commission reliable data on
future transactions. When licenses are procured by an importer or
exporter for a particular transaction, he is required to post a bond
guaranteeing that he will actually complete the transaction. The
amount of the bond depends upon the nature of the transaction.
If the refund amount is set in advance, the Commission may require a higher bond than is required in other situations. Because
of this penalty for non-performance, licenses procured usually reflect anticipated imports and exports with some accuracy. The
license system was thought to be a more effective system than the
alternative approaches suggested. 5 The licensing system in general
and the forfeiture provisions in particular have survived numerous
legal attacks.
A broad challenge to the whole licensing program was brought
before the Court by a defaulting importer in 1970. 6 The plaintiff
there alleged that the entire system was illegal and articulated a
number of approaches to support the argument. First, he contended that the system violated the "principle of proportionateness" which is a basic right guaranteed by the German Constitution. Under this principle, the injury to commercial interests
should not be out of proportion to the value derived from the
existence of the regulation, in this case, the availability to the
Commission of information indicating market trends. In dismissing this argument the Court held that the uniform application of
Community law required uniform interpretation by national legal
55. See note 9 supra. Two alternative approaches to the bonding system had
been proposed. One would have created a system of fines for violation of export/import regulations. The other would have required importers and exporters
to simply report their transactions to the proper agency as they occurred. The first
was rejected as being too cumbersome to administer. The second was rejected
because it would not provide the necessary data until the transaction was completed, too late to be useful in predicting future transactions.
56. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 16 Recueil 1125, 2 CCH CoMi. MKT. REP.
8126
(1970).
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systems. Rights claimed under a national constitution have no
bearing on the legality of a Community act. 7 However, the Court
suggested that certain basic rights exist under Community law as
well, "inspired by the constitutional traditions common to all
Member States," and carry over into Community law.58 The
Court found, however, that none of those basic rights had been
violated by the licensing system. Regulation No. 120/67 endowed
the Commission with the responsibility of watching the market
closely and projecting trends based on their observations, and
authorized the Commission to take any measures necessary to
obtain information. The Court held that the licensing system
devised by the Commission effectively fulfilled the stipulations
of the regulation. The burden created by the bonds was not, in
the Court's view, excessive. In finding that the licensing system is
a reasonable means of achieving the objectives of Regulation No.
120/67, the Court apparently answered the "basic rights" argument but the Court never expressly indicated whether the "principle of proportionateness" is one of the basic rights common to
all Member States and therefore a right also guaranteed under
Community law." The decision does establish the legality of the
licensing system in principle and upheld the viability of the CAP.
Commission regulations usually provide that the duty to import
or export is extinguished and the bond returned to the importer in
circumstances characterized as "force majeure."10The general concept of force majeure is well established in civil law but construed
in a narrow, technical fashion." The cases suggest that the Court
2 CCH CoiM. MKT. REP. %8126 at 7424.
2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. %8126 at 7425.
2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8126 at 7425-27.
60. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 428 (1973).
61. The concept of force majeure has been given this definition: "According
to the concept of force majeure, a contract will be rescinded ... and no liability
will be incurred by a party to it for the non-performance by such party of his
obligations under the contract, by reason of an event which could not have been
reasonably foreseen by the parties at the time the contract was entered into.
Performance of the contract must be absolutely impossible, and must not be
merely onerous for a party in order to constitute force majeure." David,
Frustrationof Contract in French Law, 28 J. Comp. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.)
11 (1946), as cited in 3 TEX. INT'L L.F. 275 (1967). This article compares the
application of the doctrine of force majeure (or impossibility of performance) in
the United States, France, Germany, and the Nordic countries. The author suggests there that the doctrine as construed in France required absolute impossibility, and was consequently applied more strictly than in the common law countries.
57.
58.
59.
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of Justice has broadened the doctrine to encompass a broader
range of circumstances. The Schwarzwaldmilch case12 reflects this
more flexible view. There the Court suggested that the application
of the doctrine should depend upon a balancing of the public interest in obtaining reliable market information against the need, also
in the public interest, of not hampering trade with obligations that
are too burdensome. The Court's concept of force majeure required
the presence of three elements: (1) a highly unusual event that
anyone acting prudently and with the care of an ordinary businessman would have considered highly improbable; (2) consequences
unavoidable through the exercise of reasonable care; and (3) a
causal relationship between the improbable event and the importer's failure to perform.13 The Court determined that the burden
of proof is on the importer to establish these elements. 4 Under this
interpretation of force majeure, circumstances not specifically enumerated by regulations may excuse a failure to conduct the import
operation. Later decisions have consistently recognized this more
flexible standard, but have refused to expand it beyond factual
events operating independently on the importer for fear that the
utility of the licensing system would be impaired. 5 An importer
claiming force majeure must do so without delay, and a Member
State which allows the defense must notify the Commission that
67
it has done so.
62. Firma Schwarzwaldmilch GmbH v. Einfihr- und Vorratsstelle fir Fette,
14 Recueil 549, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8062, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 406 (1968).
In his conclusions, Advocate General Gand discusses the concept of force majeure.
2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8062 at 7961-62, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 409-10. The
plaintiff-importer had a license to import powdered milk into Germany, but was
unable to deliver due to factory equipment failure. Plaintiff contended that mechanical breakdown should fall within force majeure.
63. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8062 at 7958-59, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 41617.
64. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8062 at 7959, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 417.
65. See, e.g., Firma E. Kampffmeyer v. Einfdhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, [1974] European Court Reports 101 [hereinafter cited
as E.C.R.], 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8261 (1974); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einftihr- und Vorratsstelle far Getreide und Futtermittel, 16
Recueil 1125, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8126 (1970).
66. Einftihr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel v. Wilhelm
Pfutzenreuther, [1974] E.C.R. 589, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8262 (1974).
67. Getreide-Import GmbH v. Einfihr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und
Futtermittel, 16 Recueil 1107, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8123 (1970). Although
notification is required of the Member State by EEC regulations, failure to notify
the Commission has no legal effect on the liability of the parties.
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C. Tariff Regulations and Intervention Rules
A significant number of agricultural decisions by the Court have
dealt with clarifications of EEC tariff regulations. These situations
often arise when an importer attempts to bring a product that does
not precisely conform to existing tariff categories across national
borders. The most illustrative example of this situation occurred
when an importer cleared through customs a quantity of turkey
tails. The importer sought to have the product classified as "edible
offals," but the German customs office, seeking to collect a higher
levy, chose to characterize the product as "poultry parts."6 In
responding to the referred questions, the Court emphasized the
importance of uniform interpretation of Community regulations.
These regulations, the Court declared, may only be interpreted
according to Community law since they must have the same meaning in all Member States. While a Member State may interpret a
tariff heading, it may only do so by observing Community law, and
may not enact binding rules of interpretation." The Court has
responded similarly to a substantial number of cases raising the
issue.7"
The Court has also insisted on resolving disputes which have
arisen in the interpretation of intervention rules. The intervention
system is a market device operated by the Member States and
financed by the Community. A national intervention agency purchases farm products from producers when the price for the product falls to a predetermined "intervention price. ' ' 71 If the mecha-

nism functions properly it insures stabilized markets and helps
guarantee a fair standard of living for farmers. The Court views the
proper functioning of the intervention system as so critical to Community agricultural policy that it has carefully negated every at68. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v. Firma Paul G. Bollmann, 16 Recueil
69, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8098, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 141 (1970).
69. 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8098 at 8402, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 153.
70. See, e.g., Heinrich P. Brodersen Machf. v. Einfihr- und Vorratsstelle far
Getreide und Futtermittel, 17 Recueil 1069, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8154
(1971) (defining "pearled barley"); Firma Gunter Henck v. Hauptzollamt Emmerich (3 cases), 17 Recuei 743, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8145 (1971) (defining
"grains, kibbled, of corn"); 17 Recueil 767, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8146 (1971)
(defining "coarse meal of corn"); 17 Recuei 779, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8147
(1971) (defining "grains, kibbled, of millet"); Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v.
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft, 16 Recueil 427, 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 8093, 9
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 466 (1970) (defining "cassava flour").
71. See note 25 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the intervention system.
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tempt by the Member States to make binding decisions regarding
intervention policy.
In one instance, Commission regulations provided that wheat
could be sold to the intervention agency by "any holder" of wheat
in certain predetermined lots. The French intervention agency issued regulations which narrowed that right permitting only approved purchasing organizations to sell to the intervention
agency. 72 The French agency argued that this regulation was a
justified refinement in the definition of the term "holder" arising
out of the special circumstances of the French grain market. The
Court, however, refused to permit the term "any holder" to be
narrowed by the French agency. For the system to work as it
should, the Court emphasized that the intervention market must
be as accessible to as many producers as possible to permit the
unhampered movement of grain. The French regulation could have
had the effect of impeding participation in the intervention market
by grain producers whom the agency was initially designed to assist. 73 The Court chose to preclude this constricting interpretation
by denying the Member State agencies the authority to interpret
the Community regulation.
A review of the cases dealing with this particular area suggests
that the Court is attempting to confine the latitude of Member
State decision-making to achieve Community uniformity. Member
States cannot deviate from Community rules unless the rules expressly provide for such a deviation, 74 but must provide and operate the administrative mechanism while the power to make interstitial interpretations of the governing regulations lies entirely outside their authority. This approach insures uniform application of
rules. The tenor of the Court's opinions suggests that this uniformity is really the paramount goal. A necessary corollary of this
approach, however, is that the Court will be required to decide a
substantial number of cases requiring the interpretation of relatively ephemeral regulations. Conceivably, every dispute over the
interpretation of a tariff heading could be referred to the Court for
resolution. While a large number of referrals could bulge the
Court's caseload with trivial matters, such referrals will also neces72. Syndicat National du Commerce Ext~rieur des C~r~ales v. Office National
Interprofessionnel des C~r6ales, 16 Recueil 1233, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8122
(1970).
73. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8122 at 7371-72.
74. See, e.g., Hagen OHG v. Einffihr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und
Futtermittel, 18 Recueil 23 (1971).
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sarily hamper the Member State's administration of Community
regulations with additional bureaucratic entanglements. At least
for the present, the Court has balanced the competing interests
and chosen to accept these liabilities in order to achieve muchdesired uniformity.
D.

Refund Cases

Created as a part of Council Regulation No. 19 of April 4, 1962,7the refund system permits Member States to grant refunds to exporters who ship certain kinds of products to other Member States
and third countries. The payments to exporters are designed to
stimulate interest in shipping surplus goods to non-EEC countries.
The refund compensates for the difference in the Community price
and the lower world market price. By structuring the incentives in
this way, the Member States reduce the possibility that they will
be caught trying to outbid each other on refund premiums with
little or no net decrease in the total surplus of the product. 71 In
certain instances, the exporter may wish to "lock in" the amount
of his refund. However, he must pay a higher bond premium in
order to obtain this additional security. The administering authority can fix the refund by declaring in advance the market price of
the exported product. In this way, the exporter does not risk price
fluctuations that might occur between the contract date and the
date of the export.77
Another device used to shape economic objectives is the production refund. This mechanism is used to keep the price of certain
products low enough that the producers of those products do not
lose their standard industrial markets. The refund is paid to the
producer by the Member State in whose territory the product was
used in the industry for which it was intended. In one instance the
Community granted a production refund on broken rice intended
for use in the brewing industry to keep the price sufficiently low
so that brewers would not seek rice sources elsewhere. In a case
arising under the regulation, the Court made clear that the pro75. Council Regulation No. 19 of April 4, 1962, [1962] Official Journal of the
European Communities 933, art. 20(2).
76. See Firma E. Kampffmeyer v. Einffihr- und Vorratsstelle f,3r Getreide und
Futtermittel, 18 Recueil 213, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP.
8182 at 8459 (1972)
(comments by the Commission interpreting regulation 19/62).

77, Einfihr- und Vorratsstelle fdir Getreide und Futtermittel v. Gunther
Henck, 16 Recueil 1183, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8128 at 7459 (1970) (construing Commission Regulation No. 102/64).
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ducer of the product and not the using industry was the rightful
claimant of the refund." While a producer might assign his right
to the refund to the industry, the industry had no standing to sue
79
for the refund in their own behalf.
Community regulations closely govern the refund operation. The
Member States administer the program, but they have no authority to modify Community regulations governing the refund system.
The Court struck down an attempt by the German Government to
establish a six-month statute of limitations on refund applications.80 While the Member States may for administrative reasons
require the application to be submitted in a particular form, the
Court explicitly declared that the exporter cannot be penalized for
his failure to follow the form by denying him the refund. The Court
emphasized that uniform application was necessary to prevent
exporters from being treated differently by the various national
systems.8"
The exporter or importer must meet certain quality standards
to receive the refund. These regulations and the Court decisions
construing them require the Member States to follow Commission
regulations with particularity in order to assure uniform application throughout the EEC.12 The national courts have the responsibility for interpreting the validity of any particular inspection,
taking into consideration the nature, characteristics, and packaging of goods, and any other evidence of legal remedies the exporter
may bring under national law. 3
V1I.

LEVY CASES

One of the most fertile areas of Community litigation has been
the interpretation of the variable levy. 4 Because it is so intimately
connected with every financial transaction between Member
States, the Court has frequently been called upon to interpret its
provisions.
78. Birra Dreher SpA v. Amministrazione della Finanze dello Stato [1974]
E.C.R. 201, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8264 (1974).
79. [1974] E.C.R. at 213, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8264 at 9171-17.
80. Schluter & Maack v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 18 Recueil 307, 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8186 (1972).
81. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8186 at 8511.
82. See, e.g., NV Vereenigde Oliefabrieken v. Produktschap voor Margarine,
Vetten en Olien, 18 Recueil 1031, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8195 (1972).
83. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8195 at 8633-34.
84. See notes 28, 29 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the
variable levy.
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The amount of the levy is set by the Commission and collected
by the Member States as a product moves into the Member State
from third countries. (The intra-Community levies were completely removed at the end of the transition period, December 31,
1969). Two factors determine the amount of the levy, the free-tofrontier price of the product at the border and the threshold price
in the importing state. The levy is equal to the difference between
the two. The Court has been confronted with litigation challenging
the Commission's calculation of both of these price systems.
The threshold price, the first factor in determining the amount
of the levy, is designed to equal the target price when the cost of
marketing the product is added to it.8" Importers seeking to reduce
the levy have argued that the Commission underestimated the
costs of marketing their product, thus causing the threshold price
to be set too high. In one instance, an importer attempted to show
that his marketing costs were substantially more than the standard estimate set by the Commission. In denying the importer's
argument, the Court held that marketing costs are calculated on
a flat rate based on a standard cost that every importer of the
product would incur in such a transaction rather than on the ac86
tual cost incurred by a particular importer for a specific delivery.
However, the Court has also said that marketing costs include only
those costs incurred in carrying out the procedures and legal formalities necessary to import the products in question and in transporting those products to the first wholesale marketing stage in the
area to which the basic target price applies."
The second factor in the variable levy is the free-to-frontier
price. This price is determined by adding the cost of freight, insurance, and other costs (not including duties or levies) to the actual
price of the product being imported. It is set every Friday for the
following week by the Commission on the basis of prices most
favorable to the importing Member State based on representative
prices and taking into account the lowest marketing and shipping
costs to the frontier crossing point for the marketing area of the
85. See, e.g., Getreide-Import GmbH v. Einfthr- und Vorratsstelle far Getreide und Futtermittel, [1973] E.C.R. 919, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8222
(1973).
86. [19731 E.C.R. at 926, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8222 at 9036.
87. In this case, the Court found that the cost of plant inspections, control
costs, the cost of customs clearance, bank charges, expenses relating to the presentation of documents, and expenses relating to security that must be posted were
not included in the calculation of marketing costs. [1973] E.C.R. at 926, 2 CCH
Comm. MKT. REP.

8222 at 9036-37.
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importing Member State in greatest need of additional supplies."
Thus, a larger estimate of allowable costs by the Commission will
mean that the importer will pay a smaller amount in levies. Here
also, the Court has held that the relevant cost is the cost which is
generally borne by exporters up to the frontier, not those costs
actually incurred by an exporter for a particular transaction.89
Since the levy is established and governed by the Commission,
it is intended to be applied uniformly to all the Member States.9"
Although the levy system gives agricultural transactions a treatment unique from that accorded other kinds of transfers in the
EEC, the Court has found the levy to be a legal exception to those
treaty provisions since it is specially designed to achieve the goals
described in article 39 of the treaty.91
To insure the Community character and uniformity of application of the levy system, the Court has had to resolve the disputes
which arose under the system. Reflecting this commitment to uniformity, the Court has held that the Member States must collect
the levy in precisely the fashion prescribed by EEC regulations.92
Since the Member States are responsible for the administration of
the levy system, the Court permits some flexibility in prescribing
measures that prevent evasion of the levy. Such police measures
may not, however, subject importers to any additional conditions
that are not compatible with the criteria forming the basis of Community rules.9"
Since the levy varies from week to week, the Commission has
established a procedure which enables an importer or exporter to
have the levy set in advance,94 eliminating the risk that a future
88. See, e.g., Gesellschaft ffir Getreidehandel AG v. Einffihr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, 18 Recueil 1071, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP.
8192 at 8587 (1972).
89. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8192 at 8592.
90. See Firma Max Neumann v. Hauptzollamt Hof/Saale, 13 Recueil 571, 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8059 at 7909 (1967).
91. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8059 at 7908.
92. Belgium v. NV Cobelex, 18 Recueil 1055, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8187
(1972) (an importing Member State must collect the "third country" refunds (a
special pricing arrangement designed to make Community products competitive
with products from non-member states) immediately after the refunds have been
paid, not at some later date upon which the importing state is free to decide).
93. See Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-St. Annen, 17 Recueil 49, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8132, 10 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 260 (1971).
94. This so-called "levy set in advance" is similar to the refund procedure
discussed in note 77 supraand accompanying text. The Court found this provision
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levy increase may make transactions unprofitable. In proper circumstances, the importer or exporter may have the levy rescinded.
The Court has determined, however, that such a rescission will not
entitle the merchant to a refund on portions of the product already
exported."
Most of the questions decided by the Court regarding the levy
have been relatively trivial." (Some of the cases not discussed here
in the text are indicative of the obscurity of the questions the Court
has had to resolve). These cases illustrate once again that the
Court's greatest interest is in achieving a uniform interpretation
and application of Community rules.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Justice spends a very significant portion of its time
deciding cases related to the CAP." This is partly a reflection of
the size and importance of farming and farming-related industries
in the European economy. But such an explanation is inadequate
to describe why most of the decisions handed down by the Court
involve the interpretation of relatively insignificant regulations
often applying only to the most obscure fact situations. Few of the
decisions discussed here can be characterized as major decisions.
When these cases are viewed as a unit, however, they take on
significance. They reflect a policy choice made by the Court that
agriculture is going to be a Community enterprise governed by
uniformly applied Community law and that the Member States
will have no significant role in policy matters involving that area
of the economy. Most of the cases decided by the Court involving
agricultural problems could have been decided fairly and competently by the courts of the Member States. But to give Member
States flexibility in interpreting and applying Community rules
to be legal under EEC articles 40 and 43 in Deutsche Tradax GmbH v. Einfrthrund Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel, 17 Recueil 145, 2 CCH CoMMf.
MKT. REP.

8130 (1971).

95. Cooperatieve Vereniging "Necomaut" GA v. Hoofdproduktschap voor
Akkerbouwprodukten & Produktschap voor Granen, Zaden en Peulvruchten, 16
Recueil 921, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8112, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 138 (1970).
96. See Paul Craeynest & Michel Vandewalle v. Belgium, 16 Recueil 905, 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8111 (1970); Deutsche Getreide- und Futtermittel Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Altona, 16 Recueil 1055, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
8121, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 205 (1970).
97. Of the eighty-nine cases decided by the European Court of Justice since
November 15, 1972, fifty-two have involved questions relating to the Community
regulation of agriculture.
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would, in the Court's view, permanently encumber the achievement of the meaningful common agricultural policy sought by the
treaty. While the national states may be gaining policy-making
power generally, the Court, particularly in the agriculture decisions, is exerting a consistent influence to insure that the decisionmaking authority flows the other way.
Stanley D. Miller

